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WILLIAM C. GREEN* 
Japan's rising economic prowess in the 1980's and its penetration 
of the North American automobile marketplace produced a major 
economic restructuring. Seven Asian automobile assembly plants, 
along with four Japanese-Big Three joint ventures, and GM's Saturn 
were built across the industrial heartland of the United States and 
Canada. 1 This common experience, accompanied by a transformation 
in industrial . production methods and the reorganization of work 
defined in terms of Japanese lean production techniques and coop-
erative labor relations, created a crisis for the Fordist regime of 
industrial production, its system of labor-management relations, and 
organized labor. 2 Lean production has also created a crisis for the 
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I. The term "Japanese transplants" will be used to describe the Japanese auto plants 
in the United States and Canada which have never operated as joint ventures with an American 
Big Three auto firm. They are the Honda plants in Marysville, Ohio, and Alliston, Ont.; the 
Toyota plants in Georgetown, Ky. and Cambridge, Ont.; the Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tenn.; 
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) paradigm.3 The NLRA, the 
legal foundation for United States and Canadian labor-management 
relations, carves out a limited right for labor to organize, to negotiate 
with management over wages, hours, and working conditions, and to 
take concerted action, but which otherwise gives labor and manage-
ment a considerable freedom to privately determine the substance of 
their collectively bargained contracts. 4 
In this article, I argue that the NLRA paradigm faces a dual 
crisis. The paradigm's public law dimension, based on United States 
and Canadian labor statutes, is threatened by Asian auto transplants 
which have traded upon its narrow statutory confines to avoid un-
ionization and to suppress union organizing efforts by using lean 
production-based plant location criteria, worker recruitment and train-
ing methods, and team concept production practices. At the same 
time, the paradigm's private law dimension, based on collectively 
bargained agreements, is being altered by the Japanese-Big Three joint 
ventures and Saturn which have used the NLRA's freedom of contract 
to abandon the highly formalized and detailed contracts produced by 
adversarial labor-management relations and to negotiate lean produc-
tion high-trust cooperative labor agreements with the UA W and CAW. 
In addition, the Saturn Labor Agreement has employed co-determi-
nation principles to extend labor participation beyond joint shop floor 
governance to strategic decision making.5 Yet, these agreements, along 
with the Asian transplants' anti-union strategy, have been perceived 
as management efforts to use lean production and co-determination 
principles to extend and enhance managerial power at labor's expense. 
As a consequence, the NLRA paradigm has become contested terrain. 
Labor and management's arguments and actions have already begun 
to redefine the paradigm's adversarial character and have established 
the agenda for the current debate over United States labor law reform. 
To explore this argument, Part I provides a cross-national frame-
work to analyze the NLRA paradigm's dual crisis and the prospects 
for United States labor law reform. Part II defines the NLRA para-
digm and outlines the nature of the challenge it confronts from lean 
production labor relations. Parts III and IV explore the consequences 
of lean production's recruitment methods, cooperative labor-manage-
ment programs, and team concept workplace practices for the NLRA 
paradigm, first at the non-union Asian transplants and then at their 
joint ventures with the Big Three automakers and at Saturn. Finally, 
3. 29 u.s.c. § 141 (1988). 
4. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1988). 
5. BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A LABOR PER-
SPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992). 
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Part V draws upon these experiences to assess the prospects for United 
States labor law reform. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
The North American automobile industry has become the setting 
for a struggle over competing visions of labor-management relations 
in a post-Fordist world.6 A management vision, defined by Japanese 
lean production, is most ably extolled by James Womack, Daniel 
Jones and Daniel Roos, 7 and by Martin Kenney and Richard Florida. 8 
A competing labor vision, more sensitive to the cruel reality of the 
shop floor and the need for a more humane workplace, has been 
expounded upon by Knuth Dohse,9 Rianne Mahon, 10 Mike Parker 
and Jane Slaughter, 11 Alain Lipietz, 12 and Barry and Irving Blue-
stone.13 Together these visions define the issues and interests involved 
and reveal the tensions among contending labor systems built upon 
Fordist adversarialism, Japanese cooperation, and German co-deter-
mination. However, both are faulted by their failure to appreciate 
the political and legal foundations for labor-management relations 
and the limitations these realities impose upon any vision for a new 
industrial order. 
One way to understand this struggle over competing visions, 
assess their political and legal dimensions, and explore their impact 
on organized labor's current predicament and its prospects for survival 
and prosperity is to employ a cross-national perspective offered by 
Lowell Turner .14 He argues that labor-management relations are struc-
tured by two variables: "first, the extent to which unions, as a broad 
national pattern, are integrated into the processes of managerial 
decision making, especially concerning work reorganization; and sec-
ond, the existence of laws or corporatist bargaining arrange-
ments .... " 15 These two variables are the defining elements for four 
6. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2. 
7. See J. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990). 
8. MARTIN KENNEY & RICHARD FLORIDA, BEYOND MASS PRODUCTION: THE JAPANESE 
SYSTEM AND ITS TRANSFER TO THE U.S. (1993). 
9. Knuth Dohse et al., From "Fordism" to "Toyotism"? The Social Organization of 
the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 14 PoL. & Soc'Y 117 (1985). 
10. See Rianne Mahon, From Fordism to?: New Technology, Labour Markets, and 
Unions, 8 ECON. & INDUST. DEMOCRACY 5 (1987). 
11. See MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM 
CONCEPT (1988). 
12. See ALAIN LIPIETZ, TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER: POSTFORDISM, ECOLOGY, 
AND DEMOCRACY (Malcolm Slater, trans., 1992). 
13. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5. 
14. LOWELL TURNER, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: CHANGING WORLD MARKETS AND THE 
FUTURE OF LABOR UNIONS 12 (1991). 
15. /d. 
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labor relations systems summarized in Figure 1 and briefly outlined 
below. 
Figure I 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SYSTEMS 
Integration into Managerial Process 
Laws or 
Corporatist 
Bargaining 
Arrangements 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1 
Germany 
3 
Japan 
No 
2 
4 
United 
States 
Model I describes the German labor-management relations system 
in which labor unions are integrated into the process of managerial 
decision making through the medium of union-dominated works coun-
cils.16 This integration occurs from a base independent of manage-
ment, because it is supported by the Works Constitution Act of 1952 
and by a corporatist bargaining structure17 in which a nationally 
cohesive labor union movement, coordinated by one cohesive labor 
federation (the DGB or Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and supported 
by the Social Democratic Party, engages in regional collective bar-
gaining with centralized employer associations to reinforce the labor-
management system. 18 
Model II describes a labor-management relations system which 
Turner does not explicitly discuss. His analysis suggests Model II 
would exist in countries where adversariallabor-management relations 
prevail, national labor law is supportive of arms-length negotiations, 
and corporatist bargaining structures are strong. 19 In Model II coun-
tries, these three elements would be rooted in a nationally cohesive 
labor union movement coordinated by a peak labor federation which 
engages in collective bargaining with centralized employer associa-
16. Id. 
17. Turner defines corporatist structure as "regularized peak or subpeak negotiation 
between relatively cohesive units of business and labor, with the formal or informal backing 
of the state." /d. at 16. 
18. Id. at 95-103. 
19. TURNER, supra note 14, at 12-15. 
1995] NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE 421 
tions, enjoys popular support, and plays a critical role in the life of 
a nationally prominent political party. 20 
Model III describes the Japanese lean production labor-manage-
ment relations system which prevails, not only in Japan, but also in 
Japan's North American non-union transplants. 21 In this model, work-
ers and their enterprise unions are integrated into the process of 
managerial decision making in a decidedly subordinate way. 22 Inte-
gration is defined on management's terms, and corporatist bargaining 
arrangements do not exist, because workers and their unions are not 
supported by national laws which provide them with an independent 
legal basis for participation and because labor unions are fragmented 
and enjoy little popular and political support. 23 
Model IV describes the United States and Canadian labor-man-
agement relations systems dominated by adversarial arms-length bar-
gaining. Unions are not integrated into managerial decision making 
because the National Labor Relations Act and Canadian labor laws 
do not provide the legal basis for independent participation in man-
agerial decision making, 24 although integration does occur on a single 
firm or plant basis at management's initiative.25 Finally, corporatist 
bargaining structures are weak. 26 In both countries, organized labor's 
peak associations-the AFL-CIO in the United States, the Canadian 
Labor Congress (CLC) and the Canadian Federation of Labor (CFL), 
among others, in Canada-are fragmentedY However, organized 
labor in Canada, unlike the United States, enjoys popular and political 
party support sufficient to allow it to have a meaningful impact on 
labor law reform. 28 
These four labor relations systems are not equally favorable to 
the interests of organized labor. Turner argues that if labor unions 
are to survive and prosper, they must abandon adversarial arms-
length bargaining strategies and become integrated into a firm's man-
agerial decision making. 29 He asserts, however, that managerial inte-
gration involves ''substantial participation . . . with management 
regarding plans to reorganize work before actual decisions are made 
on the shape of the new organization and the pace of implementa-
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 13. 
22. !d. 
23. /d. 
24. 29 u.s.c. §§ 141-88 (1988). 
25. TURNER, supra note 14, at 13. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. at 17, 234-35. 
28. !d. at 234-35. 
29. /d. at 13. 
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tion. " 30 This will be a dangerous move, he argues, unless union 
participation is supported by national legislation which creates a legal 
framework for labors' independent status in managerial decision mak-
ing.31 
Union participation also requires a corporatist bargaining struc-
ture, the dynamic element of which is "[a] cohesive labor movement 
... one that includes a relatively small number of national unions 
and is effectively, if not formally, centralized, either through a dom-
inant central labor federation or through the centralizing influence of 
one dominant union. " 32 Unless unions become integrated on these 
terms, Turner argues, they will be subordinated to management and 
continue to decline. 33 In sum, his analysis suggests that change is 
necessary. 34 If North American organized labor keeps to its present 
Model IV path or accepts a Model III lean production-based labor-
management relations system, its future will be bleak.35 To survive 
and prosper, unions will need to move towards the Model I German 
co-determination system, but in doing so, they will have to confront 
a formidable dual task: building a cohesive labor movement and 
altering the current labor law paradigm. 
II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF NORTH AMERICAN 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
Legal paradigms are models which draw upon a nation's history 
and traditions and are reflected in its public law-its constitution, 
statutes, administrative law, and judicial decisions-and in private 
agreements. The four labor-management relations systems described 
in Section I are each based on a labor law paradigm. 36 These para-
digms, depending upon the particular nation's labor history and 
practices, may be grounded in constitutional principles regarding 
employment and work, by legislation establishing the general structure 
for labor-management relations and the respective roles of labor, 
management, and government as they may be refined by administra-
tive and judicial decisions and by labor and management's collectively 
bargained agreements and grievance arbitration decisionsY Labor law 
paradigms, thereby, express the existing labor-management consensus. 
In times of paradigm change, they also structure the strategies of the 
30. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 16. 
31. Id. 
32. /d. at 17. 
33. Id. at 16. 
34. Id. at 15. 
35. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 13. 
36. See supra notes 16-18, 24-28 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra notes 16-18, 24-28 and accompanying text. 
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participants, establish the parameters for their interaction, and define 
the prospects for legal change. In North America, labor relations are 
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) paradigm and 
its Canadian variant. 38 
2. The National Labor Relations Act Paradigm 
The United States labor-management relations system is struc-
tured by the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935.39 
Since its passage, the NLRA has been amended most notably by the 
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947,40 and 
its meanings have been elaborated by the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) and the federal courts. 41 This legislation and its ad-
ministrative and judicial case law constitute the paradigm's public law 
component to which must be added the substantial body of private 
law contained in labor and management's collectively bargained agree-
ments and grievance arbitration awards. 
The NLRA paradigm carves out a limited role for government 
regulation of labor-management relations. The National Labor Re-
lations Act was passed for the express purpose of promoting industrial 
peace by granting workers the legal right to freely choose a union, 
bargain collectively with management, and take concerted action to 
advance their organizing and bargaining rights. 42 The paradigm was 
further nar-rowed by the NLRA's Taft-Hartley Act amendments,43 
which placed substantial curbs on union power by creating six unfair 
labor practices and by authorizing state governments in Section 14(b) 
to enact Right to Work statutes which prohibit union membership as 
a condition of employment.44 With these changes, Taft-Hartley aban-
doned the Wagner Act's encouragement of organizing and collective 
bargaining and substituted a policy which provided that the NLRA 
would be '"a neutral guarantor of equal rights or, at least, reasonably 
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); CANADA LABOUR CoDE, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993). 
39. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of 
July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § I, 49 Stat. 449). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § I, 61 
Stat. 136). 
41. RAYMOND L. HOOLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR 
LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 76 (1992); Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor 
Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 65-88 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
42. Paul Rainsberger, The Constraints of Public Policy: Legal Perspectives on the Decline 
of the Labor Movement Since World War II, in U.S. LABOR RELATIONS 1945-1989 91, 94 (Bruce 
Nissen ed., 1990). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988). 
44. William J. Moore & Robert J. Newman, The Effects of Right to Work Laws, 38 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 571, 515 (1985). 
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balanced rights." ' 45 As a consequence, "Taft-Hartley represents [an] 
institutionalization of the perception of unions as a third force in the 
work force. " 46 
The National Labor Relations Act provides for labor's right to 
organize by establishing procedures for workers to select a union47 
which include an NLRB-supervised election campaign, 48 a secret bal-
lot,49 and, if the union wins, NLRB certification of the union as the 
bargaining unit. 50 The NLRB also imposes on employers and employ-
ees the duty to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and terms 
or conditions of employment including grievance rights and proce-
dures, but the statute does not explicitly limit the subjects of good 
faith bargaining. 51 Instead, it is the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB 
v. Wooster Division of Borg- Warner52 which restricts bargaining to 
mandatory subjects-wages, hours, and terms or conditions of em-
ployment-and leaves all other bargainable subjects to management's 
discretion. 53 As a consequence, the Supreme Court, by recognizing a 
broad category of permissive bargaining subjects, most often alluded 
to in management rights clauses of collective contracts, preserved 
management's exclusive right to make strategic decisions, and, subject 
to collective contractual provisions, to govern the workplace. In order 
to protect labor's legal right to organize and unionized labor's col-
lective bargaining rights, 54 the NLRA prohibits unfair labor practices 
and authorizes the NLRB to hear and, subject to judicial review, to 
decide unfair labor practice claims.55 
This public law component created the structure for labor's 
organizing and contracting behavior and allowed labor and manage-
ment the freedom to complete the paradigm by creating a body of 
private law contained in their collectively bargained agreements in-
45. Adams, North American Industrial Relations: Divergent Trends in Canada and the 
United States, 128 INT'L LAB. REv. 47 (1989). 
46. Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 98. 
47. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (1988). 
48. 29 u.s.c. § 153 (1988). 
49. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (1988). 
so. !d. 
51. 29 u.s.c. §§ 141-88 (1988). 
52. 356 u.s. 342 (1958). 
53. /d. at 349. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed and explained its Borg- Warner 
decision in Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) and First Nat'! 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road 
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 
VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982) (arguing that a union's bargaining power is limited by the principle 
that a union may not interfere with an employer's product market decisions); Note, The Impact 
of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1225 (1959). 
54. 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1988). 
55. /d. 
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eluding provisions for grievance settlement. As Thomas Kochan, Harry 
Katz, and Robert McKersie have observed, "[t]he NLRA did not 
dictate the terms or conditions of employment but endorsed a process 
by which the parties could shape their own substantive contract 
terms. " 56 The UA W has used this limited regulatory framework to 
organize the nation's auto workers and to negotiate highly formalized 
and detailed collective bargaining agreements with the Big Three 
automakers. The 1948 GM-UA W agreement defined the three major 
elements of the NLRA paradigm's private law component: 57 first, a 
three year wage and fringe benefit structure negotiated by the UAW's 
national office;58 second, a job control-focused work rule structure59 
whose "general principles and rules governing seniority, job classifi-
cations, production conditions, and mechanisms for resolving griev-
ances" are negotiated by the UAW's national office and whose 
detailed job descriptions are negotiated by each local for the plants 
it represents;60 and third, a contract administered by the local union 
under the supervision of the national office.61 
The Canadian labor-management relations system bears the im-
print of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and bestows upon 
provincial governments the primary responsibility for private sector 
labor relations. 62 This Canadian legislation also creates a limited 
regulatory labor-management relations system to promote industrial 
peace by granting workers the limited legal right to freely choose a 
union, to bargain collectively with management, and to take concerted 
action. 63 To implement these rights, federal and provincial labor 
relations boards, subject to judicial review, are responsible for "union 
certification, unfair labor practices, and in some cases, industrial 
conflict and the regulation of internal union affairs. " 64 Otherwise, 
the Canadian paradigm has been completed at labor and manage-
56. THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 24 (1986). 
51. John Holmes, New Production Technologies, Labour and the North American Auto 
Industry, in LABOUR, ENVIRONMENT AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 87, 100 (G.J.R. Linge & G.A. 
van den Knaaf eds., 1989). 
58. /d. 
59. Job control-focused collective agreements link a worker's pay to the wage rates for 
a specific job classification and job access to the worker's seniority. /d. at 101. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. Adams, supra note 45, at 47. 
63. /d. 
64. H.W. ARTHURS ET AL., LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 57 (1988). 
All Canadian provinces, except Quebec, have a labor relations statute which establishes a labor 
relations tribunal for the private sector. "Tn Quebec, such functions are divided between a 
Labor Court/Tribunal du travail and department officials called commissioners/commissaires." 
/d. 
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ment's initiative by means of collectively bargained agreements and 
grievance arbitration. 65 
The Canadian paradigm differs in some significant ways from 
its United States counterpart. Labor law is not based on a single 
federal statute, but, as noted above, upon both federal and provincial 
legislation. 66 Yet "the various Canadian [provincial] statutes are suf-
ficiently similar to allow us to speak of a distinctive Canadian model 
of representation . . .. ''67 Canadian labor laws are more supportive 
of union labor, because they do not contain a Taft-Hartley type 
provision which qualifies a union's right to exclusive representation 
and treats the union as "a third force" in the workplace.68 Nor does 
Canadian federal legislation recognize the right of the provinces to 
enact Right to Work statutes.69 Other significant statutory provisions 
include stricter union security agreements, stronger unfair labor prac-
tices provisions, limited use of replacement workers, labor relations 
board-imposed first collective contracts when the parties disagree, and 
more restricted judicial review of labor board decisions. 70 
Canadian labor law contains more favorable procedures for union 
recognition and certification based upon the card system. 71 Ontario's 
Labor Relations Act, for example, provides that if a union signs at 
least 55 percent of the employees, the union can be automatically 
certified as the bargaining agent. 72 A vote is necessary only if a union 
signs less than 55 percent, but more than 45 percent. 73 Moreover, 
Canadian labor law does not clearly restrict the subjects of good faith 
bargaining to mandatory subjects and leaves all other bargainable 
(permissive) subjects to management's discretion.74 Arthurs has found 
that Canadian labor arbitrators are divided between a '''reserved 
rights' approach ... premised on the assumption that management 
... does not surrender its traditional right to manage ... [and one 
that] treat[s] the collective agreement as creating a new legal regime 
that puts the trade union and employer on an equal footing. "'5 As a 
consequence, Canadian labor law may not be as wedded as the United 
65. /d. 
66. /d. 
67. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under 
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1806 n.l34 (1983). 
68. ARTHURS, supra note 64, at 167. 
69. Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 98. 
70. Kenneth W. Thornicroft, Unions, Union Dues, and Political Activity: A Canada/ 
U.S. Comparative Analysis, 41 LAB. L.J. 846, 846 (1990). 
71. Weiler, supra note 67, at 1806-11. 
72. Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 228, § 7 (1980) (Can.). 
73. /d. 
74. ARTHURS, supra note 64, at 298. 
75. /d. 
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States to protecting management's exclusive right to make strategic 
decisions and may be open to organized labor's participation on the 
basis of a collectively bargained contract. 
Canadian labor law, having created an NLRA structure for 
labor's organizing and contracting behavior, has allowed labor and 
management to complete the paradigm by creating a body of private 
law contained in their collectively bargained agreements. Within this 
framework, the Canadian auto workers, as members of the UA W's 
Canadian region, relied upon provincial labor law to develop the 
Canadian equivalent of the Fordist adversarial labor-management 
relations system, one also defined by highly formalized and detailed 
collective bargaining agreements modeled on the three major elements 
of the 1948 GM-UAW model. 76 This labor relations system, which 
defined life on the shop floor during the "glory years," began to 
disintegrate during the era of capitalist industrial restructuring and 
double-digit inflation of the 1980s. 77 The UAW's acceptance of the 
Big Three automaker's demands for concessions and cooperation led 
to unbridgeable differences which forced the Canadian UA W to break 
away by 1985 and pursue a traditional adversarial collective bargaining 
and a no concessions strategy. 78 Thereafter, the Japanese transplants 
presented a new challenge to the separate labor-management visions 
of both unions. 
B. The Lean Production Labor Relations Model 
Japan has been the major force behind the global restructuring 
of the automobile industry, its organization of work, and its labor-
management relations. In the space of one decade, six Japanese 
automobile firms built assembly plants across the North American 
industrial heartland and four Japanese firms-Mazda, Mitsubishi, 
Suzuki, and Toyota-established joint ventures with the Big Th"ree 
automakers. 79 With them the Japanese brought their lean production 
methods and labor relations system which had made them a compet-
itive force in the international automobile marketplace. 80 
Lean production's principles and practices have created a crisis 
for the Fordist regime of industrial production, its labor relations 
76. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
77. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 33-43. 
78. See generally Sam Gindin, Breaking Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto 
Workers, 29 STuD. IN PoL. EcoN. 63 (1989) (arguing that increasing differences in goals forced 
split in UAW); Charlotte Yates, The Internal Dynamics: Explaining Canadian Autoworkers' 
Militancy in the 1980's, 31 STUD. IN POL. EcoN. 73 (1990) (arguing that the CAW has increased 
union power in the workplace but faces significant future challenges). 
79. KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 8, at 95-102; see supra note I. 
80. Jd. at 102-05. 
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system, and the NLRA paradigm, because lean production rejects the 
basic elements of the Fordist production model, its adversarial style 
of labor-management relations, and the legal rights of North American 
workers. Under lean production, wages, work rules, and jobs are not 
negotiated, because the workers do not belong to autonomous unions. 81 
Workers, or "production associates," are paid essentially the same 
wage, except for a small supplement received by team leaders.82 Work 
rules are flexible and job classifications are minimal, because the team 
concept emphasizes multitask training, job rotation, and performance 
of housekeeping and maintenance duties. 83 Since corporatist bargain-
ing arrangements do not exist and labor has no independent legal 
basis for participation,84 lean production's cooperative labor-manage-
ment relations mean that workers are integrated into the process of 
decision making on management's terms. 
Lean production and its labor relations system have challenged 
both the United States and Canadian labor-management relations 
systems and their legal paradigms in two settings.85 In a non-union 
Asian transplant setting, lean production practices have subtly un-
dermined their workers' NLRA right to organize and made it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the UA W and CAW to organize transplant 
workers. 86 In a union setting, lean production at the Japanese-Big 
Three joint ventures and Saturn has not so much threatened union 
organizing or collective bargaining rights, as it has challenged the 
national UA W and CAW offices to design a labor-management strat-
egy in cooperation with their union locals for collective bargaining 
and shop floor representation which effectively protects their mem-
bers' interestsY 
III. NORTH AMERICAN LABOR LAW AND LEAN PRODUCTION AT 
NoN-UNION JAPANESE TRANSPLANTS 
The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers have 
faced their toughest challenge from the five non-union Asian trans-
81. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 218-19. 
82. KENNEY & fLORIDA, supra note 8, at 112. 
83. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 219-20. 
84. /d. at 13. 
85. Daniel Drache & Harry Glasbeek, The New Fordism in Canada: Capital's Offensive, 
Labour's Opportunity, 27 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 517 (1989); Stephen Hertzenberg, Whither Social 
Unionism? Labor and Restructuring in the U.S. Auto Industry in THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUC-
TURING : NORTH AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENTS RESPOND 314 (Jane Jenson & Rianne Mahon 
eds., 1993) (hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING); Donald M. Wells, Recent Inno-
vations in Labour-Management Relations: R_isks and Prospects for Labour in Canada and the 
United States in THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING 287, supra; Charlotte Yates, Curtains or 
Encore: Possibilities for Restructuring in the Canadian Auto Industry in THE CHALLENGE OF 
RESTRUCTURING 337, supra. 
86. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70-73. 
87. Id. at 61-70. 
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plant firms: Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Toyota, and Subaru-lsuzu. 
Operating outside the narrow regulatory confines of the NLRA par-
adigm and within the framework of the lean production labor-man-
agement relations, these transplant auto firms have avoided 
unionization by employing a two-part, union substitution and union 
suppression strategy. 88 
A. Asian Transplant Union Substitution Strategy 
The Japanese labor-management relations system has been trans-
ferred, in large part, to the North American non-union Asian trans-
plants.89 The transplant firms have relied upon a union substitution 
strategy which employs an interrelated set of lean production-based 
decisions about plant location, worker recruitment and training, and 
production practices to integrate their workers into the process of 
shop floor decision making in a "decidedly subordinate way. " 90 
The transplant firms have selected greenfield sites for their lean 
production facilities, because these small town locations have permit-
ted them to exercise virtually unqualified strategic control in selecting 
a work force with minimal union experience.91 Honda drew upon an 
applicant pool composed of ''young, inexperienced workers without 
previous manufacturing experience. " 92 Nissan selected Smyrna, a small 
town in Tennessee, for this reason and because the automaker believed 
that the state law would discourage union organizing . .In making its 
site selection decision, Nissan "avoid[ed] areas with strong traditions 
of labor union organization ... [and] selected Tennessee where labor 
union organizing is hampered by 'Right to Work' statutes, largely in 
order to minimize the likelihood of worker representation by the 
United Auto Workers Union."93 · 
Nissan and other transplants have also employed recruitment, 
training, and production processes to screen in lean production team 
players and screen out pro-union applicants. 94 At Subaru-lsuzu, for 
88. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAW 110 (1990). 
89. See Richard Florida & Martin Kenney, Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of 
Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S., 56 AM. Soc. REv. 381 (1991); and KENNEY & 
FLORIDA, supra note 8. 
90. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 13. 
91. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70; see supra note 1. 
92. HARUO SHIMADA & JOHN PAUL McDUFFIE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND "HUMAN-
WARE": JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES 53 
(1987). 
93. Andrew Mair et al., The New Geography of Automobile Production: Japanese 
Transplants in North America 64 EcoN. GEOG. 352, 366 (1988); KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra 
note 2, at I 01. 
94. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70. · 
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example, the recruitment process included a questionnaire with state-
ments on labor-management relations designed to eliminate applicants 
with pro-union sympathies and group exercises· to test an applicant's 
ability to perform as a team player.95 Subaru-Isuzu's worker training 
has emphasized the transmission of company values and its use of 
the team concept, kaizen, and just-in-time lean production practices 
has maximized managerial shop floor control. 96 Of these, the team 
concept was the most potent control mechanism, because Subaru-
Isuzu used it not merely to reorganize and set the pace for work, but 
also to frustrate labor organizing by creating a management-defined 
shop floor culture.97 Subaru-lsuzu and the other transplants have been 
enormously successful. None of their assembly plants have been 
organized. 98 Lean production, however it may be practiced, is firmly 
in place at the Asian transplants where management-defined employee 
participation is limited to the shop floor. 
The Asian transplant firms' location, recruitment, and training 
practices do not violate the NLRA and Canadian labor law which is 
largely limited to labor organizing, collective bargaining, and con-
certed action.99 The labor laws of both countries do not clearly extend 
to organized labor the right to participate in these strategic decisions, 
because they are managerial prerogatives. Although lean production, 
as a production method, is unlikely to raise any NLRA or Canadian 
labor law issues, management's use of lean production teams in a 
non-union setting may intrude upon their worker's right to organize 
an autonomous union. 100 
The team concept has become the subject of considerable legal 
controversy in the United States. 101 Whether the use of lean production 
95. Laurie Graham, Screening for a Union Free Environment 68 (1991) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University). 
96. Laurie Graham, Inside a Japanese Transplant: A Critical Perspective, 20 WoRK & 
OccUPATIONS 147, 161-62 (1993). 
97. Id. 
98. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 72. 
99. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988) and Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993). 
The Canadian national statute is supplemented by provincial legislation. See supra notes 62-65, 
and accompanying text. 
100. KENNEY & fLORIDA, supra note 8, at 284. 
101. NLRA Section 8(a)(2) has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. See, 
e.g., David H. Brody, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts Under Section 
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REv. 545 (1988); Shaun G. Clarke, 
Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 
8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021 (1987); Andrew A. Lipskey, Participatory Management Schemes, 
the Law, and Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 667 
(1990); Robert B. Moberly, Worker Participation and Labor-Management Cooperation Through 
Collective Bargaining, 15 STETSON L. REv. 99 (1985); Note, Participatory Management Under 
Section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985). 
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teams by non-union Asian transplants violates the National Labor 
Relations Act involves two related questions. First, is a lean produc-
tion team a Section 2(5) labor organization? To be a labor organi-
zation, the employees must participate; the employee group must exist 
"for the purpose of dealing with the employer"; and must concern 
itself with "'grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work. "' 102 Second, if the team is a 
labor organization, the next question is whether the employer has 
committed a Section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice by taking actions 
"to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of 
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to 
it. ... , 103 
These questions cannot be answered in the abstract, because it is 
not clear how individual Asian transplant firms may use production 
teams, nor is there any judicial consensus on whether these production 
teams violate the NLRA. The federal appellate courts are divided 
over whether the NLRA's central purpose to prevent industrial strife 
can be best furthered by an interpretation of the statute which pro-
motes an adversarial or a cooperative style of labor-management 
relations. 
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon 
Co., 104 interpreted Section 2(5) to provide the widest opportunity for 
workers to organize autonomous unions and bargain at arms-length 
with management. 105 A federal court applying Cabot Carbon would 
give a broad reading to Section 2(5)'s "dealing with" language and, 
thereby, leave very little room for a lean production team to qualify 
as anything other than a labor organization. If an employee group 
made proposals or recommendations, had discussions, asked ques-
tions, or offered information involving "grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work" 106 
which "an employer could simply accept or reject without discus-
sion, " 107 the employee group would be a Section 2(5) labor organi-
zation because it would be "dealing with" the employer. The federal 
court would then turn to Section 8(a)(2), give a broad reading to its 
"dominates" language, condemn a firm's conduct if it merely created 
a potential for domination of the transplant team, and, thereby, 
102. John Schmidman & Kimberlee Keller, Employee Participation Plans as Section 8(a)(2) 
Violations, 35 LAB. L.J. 772, 773 (1984). 
103. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 
104. 360 u.s. 203 (1959). 
105. /d. at 218. 
106. Schmidman & Keller, supra note 102, at 773. 
107. Harold J. Datz, Employee Participation Programs: Are They Lawful Under the 
National Labor Relations Act?, 8 LAB. LAw. 81, 83 (1992). 
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impose a comprehensive ban on any employer involvement in the 
formation of a labor organization. 108 
The Supreme Court's Cabot Carbon analysis has, however, lost 
favor with the NLRB and the federal courts of appeal which prefer 
instead an interpretation which promotes a cooperative style of labor-
management relations. The NLRB or a federal court, following the 
Board's decision in General Foods Corp. 109 and the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in NLRB v. Streamway Division of Scott and Fetzer Co., 110 
would focus on the concept of representation, not mentioned in 
Section 2(5), and conclude that a transplant team was not a Section 
2(5) labor organization because it did not "represent" other employ-
ees, but instead involved mere "participation" by all members of the 
plant. 111 Alternatively, the NLRB or a federal court could rely upon 
the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Bell-Aerospace Co. 112 and 
NLRB v. Yeshiva University113 and conclude that a lean production 
team is not a Section 2(5) labor organization because it is composed 
of managerial employees. 114 
If a federal appellate court did find that a lean production team 
was a labor organization, it would turn to Section 8(a)(2) and rely 
upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Rawhide Manufac-
turing Co. v. NLRB115 which held that the NLRA did not proscribe 
mere cooperation, but only employer conduct which overrode the 
employee's free choice and constituted actual domination, interfer-
ence, or support of a labor organization.l 16 A federal court, relying 
upon Chicago Rawhide, would also find support from the Sixth 
Circuit's decisions in Federal Mogul Corporation v. NLRB117 and 
NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc. 118 and the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Hertzka and Knowles v. NLRB. 119 
108. Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation: An Anomalous 
Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 206, 216 (1987); Note, 
Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of 
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1663 (1983). 
109. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). 
110. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982). 
111. Datz, supra note 107, at 86; Raymond L. Hogler, Employee Involvement Programs 
and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The Developing Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB. 
L.J. 21 (1984). 
112. 416 u.s. 267 (1974). 
113. 444 u.s. 672 (1980). 
114. Arthur P. Menard & Anne K. Morrill, Are Faculty Members Scholars or Managers?: 
The Yeshiva Case, 30 LAB. L. REv. 754 (1979); Harold Kent, Note, Collective Authority and 
Technical Expertise: Reexamining the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 694 
(1981). 
115. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). 
116. /d. at 167. 
117. 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968). 
118. 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984). 
119. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974). 
c 
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These Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Court of Appeals decisions are 
extremely relevant because all the Japanese transplants, the Big Three-
Japanese joint ventures and Saturn, are located in these three circuits. 
As Theodore J. St. Antoine observed, these 
courts of appeals have departed from a strict reading of Section 
8(a)(2) on such avowed policy grounds as rejection of a "purely 
adversarial model of labor relations" and acceptance of a "coop-
erative arrangement [where it] reflects a choice freely arrived at and 
where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for 
the expression of employee wishes." 120 
In fact, the Sixth Circuit has said that the NLRA "must be construed 
to take into account modern industrial practices, such as employee 
participation programs." 121 So these federal court decisions, unless 
reversed by the Supreme Court, have the potential to redefine labor 
relations at UA W -organized auto plants, especially the joint ventures 
and Saturn, and to impair the union's ability to organize the trans-
plants. 
B. Asian Transplant Union Suppression Strategy 
The UA W and CAW have encountered substantial difficulties in 
organizing the Asian transplants whose greenfield locations and team-
based hiring, training, and production practices have allowed them 
to discourage union organizing efforts. 122 The UA W and CAW have 
not made serious attempts to organize the Toyota Georgetown, Ken-
tucky or Cambridge, Ontario plants. 123 The UA W initiated an organ-
izing drive at Honda in Marysville, Ohio, but discontinued the effort 
in 1985. 124 In the interim, the CAW has attempted sporadically, but 
unsuccessfully, to organize Honda in Alliston, Ontario. 125 Subaru-
Isuzu also remains non-union. 126 Only the Nissan and Hyundai plants 
have been objects of serious UA W and CAW organizing efforts. 127 
The United Auto Workers' first major transplant organizing drive 
began at Nissan in Smyrna, Tennessee where its principal issues were 
injuries and work loads. 128 The UA W's organizing effort was disad-
120. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Manage-
ment Cooperation: The Case of GM and the UA W, 33 LAW QuADRANGLE: NOTES 46, 52 (1989). 
121. Datz, supra note 107, at 86. 
122. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 70. 
123. ld. at 70-71. 
124. /d. at 71. 
125. /d. 
126. /d. 
127. /d. 
128. Jane Slaughter, Behind the UA W's Defeat at Nissan, LAB. NoTEs, Sept. 1989, at I; 
KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 266. 
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vantaged from the outset by Nissan's location in a Right to Work 
state with a unionization rate of 13.5 percent, by Nissan's recruitment 
methods which screened out applicants with union sympathies or 
experience, and by its worker training and team-based production 
methods which permitted the automaker to control the workers' shop 
floor culture. 129 
When the organizing drive began, Nissan took the typical anti-
union position "that there [wa]s no need for [their] workers to be 
represented by 'third parties,"' but then added a statement of formal 
neutrality: "If the employees choose to join the union at any time 
we will, of course, abide by that choice." 130 Then the automaker 
proceeded to conduct a vigorous anti-union campaign, asserting its 
NLRA Section 8(c) free speech right: "Nissan used its plant-wide 
video system and the daily work group meetings to hammer home its 
anti-union message .... The day before the vote, Nissan shut down 
the line for up to an hour on each shift for captive audience meet-
ings."131 On July 26, 1989, Nissan workers voted 1,622 to 711, 69 
percent to 31 percent, against UAW representations. 132 In the wake 
of the defeat, it appears that worker concerns about safety were not 
all that salient, nor were their increased work loads. 133 In an anti-
union culture, most employees were more concerned that the union's 
presence would create an adversarial atmosphere. 134 
The Canadian Auto Workers began its organizing drive at Hyun-
dai's Bromont plant in 1990 where the central issues were the Korean 
auto firm's job rotation work rules and sliding-scale pension plan. 135 
Hyundai vigorously opposed the CAW's organizing efforts, but by 
December 1990 the union had acquired 350 signed union cards from· 
the plant's 700 workers, enough to request the Quebec Department 
of Labor to hold a secret ballot on CAW representation.l 36 Still the 
union decided to seek another 100 signed union cards because it 
believed that the automaker had under reported the plant's employees 
''to lull the CAW into a false target that would prevent them from 
getting the minimum number of signatures. " 137 The CAW's efforts 
129. Phil West, Will Nisson Unionize, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July 23, 1989, at 0-1. 
130. KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 8, at 284. 
131. Slaughter, supra note 128, at 13; KENNEY & FLORIDA, supra note 2, at 284, 305. 
132. Slaughter, supra note 128, at l. 
133. Free Ride in Smyrna, THE (LOUISVILLE] CoURIER JouRNAL, July 29, 1989. 
134. /d. 
135. Lindsay Chappell, CAW Tackles Hyundai Canada: Work Rules and Pensions Cited, 
AUTO. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1991, at 6. 
136. Francis Shalom, Battle to Form Union at Hyundai Heats Up: CAW Says it is Close 
to Having Enough to Hold Vote, THE (MoNTREAL] GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1990, at Cl. 
137. /d. 
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were further complicated by a Hyundai employee-initiated petition 
against unionization said to be supported by 560 assembly line work-
ers, but which the CAW and pro-union Hyundai workers suspected 
was a fraudulent management-initiated effort. 138 
In spite of Hyundai's opposition, the CAW continued its organ-
izing efforts, acquired a clear majority of signed union cards, and in 
March 1993, applied for certification, a process which could take 
"anywhere from a few months to two years." 139 However, CAW's 
success, has to be viewed against the backdrop of Hyundai's declining 
fortunes in the North American auto marketplace, rumors that it was 
contemplating moving its plant to Mexico, and in June, 1993, an 
announcement that it will temporarily suspend its Bromont operations 
to convert and renovate the plant for the production of a new car, 
the Elantra. 140 Since workers at the Bromont plant will not be recalled 
until early 1995, it is also likely that the CAW's organizing efforts 
will also be placed on hold. 
The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Worker's 
mutual failure to organize the Asian transplants raises important labor 
law questions. According to the ruling legal consensus, the Taft-
Hartley's Section 14(b) Right to Work provision burdens United States 
labor unions because it provides a union-free environment for business 
while the absence of that provision in Canadian labor law allows 
business no safe haven. Labor law scholars also claim that Canada's 
union card procedure enables its unions to be more easily certified 
while United States unions must endure a lengthy and arduous or-
ganizing campaign followed by a secret ballot. 141 The UA W and 
CAW's mutual failure casts doubt on these asserted Canadian legal 
advantages and instead suggests that it is the similarities of the NLRA 
paradigm and its Canadian variant, which do not intrude upon man-
agement's right to make strategic decisions about plant location, 
recruitment, training, and production practices, which better explain 
the ability of Asian transplant firms in both countries to avoid 
unionization. · 
On the American scene, the NLRA's Section 8(c)'s free speech 
clause, a Taft-Hartley provision, also helps explain Nissan's victory.J42 
The United States Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing 
Co. 143 and related NLRB decisions have broadly interpreted Section 
138. ld. 
139. Jeremy Sinek, Hyundai Workers Want CAW, Avro. NEws, Mar. 29, 1993, at 37. 
140. Lindsay Chappell & Jeremy Sinek, Hyundai Recoups, Revises Canada Plant, Avro. 
NEws, June 14, 1993, at 4-5. 
141. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 88, at 253-61. 
142. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
143. 395 u.s. 575 (1969). 
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8(c) to grant management considerable power during organizing cam-
paigns, because the NLRB and the Supreme Court permit management 
to deliver "a message which would be received by a reasonable listener 
as a threat or promise . . . . [including a] predict[ion] that dire 
consequences may result from a decision of workers to unionize, as 
long as those consequences are not within the direct control of the 
employer." 144 In Nissan's case, this probably means that if the UAW 
had brought a Section 8 unfair labor practice complaint against the 
automaker, the union would have been unlikely to prevail because 
the NLRB would have found that Nissan's anti-union videos, t-shirts, 
and captive audience meetings held on company time were protected 
Section 8(c) speech. Nissan's statement implying that unionization 
could mean loss of two employee benefit plans would, however, have 
provided a closer case because it was a consequence within the em-
ployer's direct control. 145 
Summary 
The Asian automobile manufacturers, using their lean production 
cooperative non-union labor relations practices, have successfully chal-
lenged United States and Canadian auto workers unions, their adver-
sarial labor-management relations systems, and their narrow job-
control based labor law paradigm. The transplants have made plant 
location choices and employed recruitment, training, and lean pro-
duction practices which create a cooperative style of labor relations 
governed by management's commitment to the principles of flexibility 
and team-based work organization. 146 At the same time, these lean 
production practices have been the basis for a two-part strategy which 
has frustrated their workers' NLRA right to organize and has made 
it impossible for the UA W and CAW to organize transplant workers. 
In fact, the transplants' task was made easier because the UAW was 
devastated by membership losses, the labor union movement was 
fragmented, corporatist bargaining arrangements were non-existent, 
and organized labor lacked popular and political support. 147 
IV. NORTH AMERICAN LABOR LAW AND LEAN PRODUCTION AT 
UA w /CAw PLANTS 
The United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers 
represent workers at the Big Three North American assembly plants 
144. Rainsberger, supra note 42, at 106-07. 
145. Stuart A. Williams, Distinguishing Protected from Unprotected Campaign Speech, 
33 LAB. L.J. 265 (1982). 
146. See supra notes 91-92, and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 23-24, and accompanying text. 
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where the Fordist labor relations system and its NLRA legal foun-
dations are largely in place. 148 Collective bargaining is still based on 
an arms-length adversarial relationship, concerns itself almost exclu-
sively with workplace matters,149 and produces nationally-defined wage 
scales, nationally and locally negotiated work rules, and a job-oriented 
shop floor. 150 Now the Fordist collectively bargained contract, as the 
private legal dimension of the NLRA paradigm and its Canadian 
variant, is being re-examined by both management and labor. The 
Big Three automakers have negotiated incremental lean production 
changes at some of their North American operations, 151 but the major 
changes which may foreshadow a paradigm change have occurred at 
one Canadian and three United States Big Three-Japanese joint ven-
ture assembly plants152- CAM! (GM-Suzuki), AutoAlliance (Ford-
Mazda), Diamond-Star (Mitsubishi-Chrysler), NUMMI (GM-Toyota) 
- and at GM's Saturn. 153 · 
Organized labor and management's willingness to redefine their 
relationship and the nature of their collective bargained agreements 
involves not merely the reorganization of work on the shop floor, 
but also extends to strategic level matters. 154 Yet, the form of these 
private agreements and their meaning for organized labor will be 
shaped by the public law component of the NLRA paradigm and its 
Canadian variant155 which largely limit labor's contractual rights to 
the shop floor, but otherwise recognize the continued pre-eminence 
of managerial power. 156 In the United States, for example, whether 
labor's rights extended to strategic matters was unclear until the 
Supreme Court's decision in Borg-Warner limited the Wagner Act's 
good faith bargaining to mandatory subjects. 157 In Canada, labor law 
less clearly restricts good faith bargaining, because arbitrators are 
divided over whether there are limitations on bargainable subjects. 158 
In practice, management in both countries has the right to make 
strategic decisions and, unless restricted by labor contract provisions, 
to decide workplace governance matters. As a result, organized labor 
participates in management's strategic decisions only on management's 
terms. 
148. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
149. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 58. 
ISO. TURNER, supra note 14, at 37. 
151. /d. at 42-90. 
152. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 60-70. 
153. /d. 
154. TURNER, supra note 14, at 44. 
155. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993). 
156. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988); Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. ch. L-1 (1993). 
157. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
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1. The New Labor-Management Contracts 
The UAW and CAW agreements with the Big Three-Japanese 
joint ventures and Saturn have been major departures from the 1948 
GM-UAW model for adversarial labor-management relations at the 
bargaining table and on the shop floor .159 Interim labor-management 
agreements, also identified as "Letters of Intent" or "Letters of 
Understanding," run counter to established United States and Ca-
nadian labor law principles governing union organizing which require 
that workers select a union. These interim agreements were negotiated 
by the UAW and CAW's national offices and were signed by union 
and automaker officials before any workers were hired or any cars 
were built. 160 These agreements provide that once a work force has 
been hired and employed, the UA W and CAW may hold represen-
tation elections and, if the union is selected as the bargaining agent, 
. it will be entitled to negotiate a contract with the automaker .161 
These interim agreements also strike at the core of the Fordist 
collectively bargained workplace contract. As high trust, cooperative 
exceptions to the Master Agreements, the UA W and CAW have 
negotiated on behalf of workers at the Big Three's North American 
auto operations; these interim agreements alter wage scales, work 
rules, and a job control-based shop floor on the basis of Japanese 
lean production labor relations principles. 162 The workplace contract 
provisions, written in very general terms, are governed by the prin-
ciples of egalitarianism, flexibility, and the team concept. 163 Instead 
of wage scales based on seniority and job assignments, workers receive 
a common base pay to which may be added a bonus based on quality, 
productivity, and performance criteria. 164 Work rules are flexible which 
means that seniority and job classifications are largely discarded for 
team-based work organization that emphasizes multi-tasked training, 
flexible hours, job and shift rotation, and the performance of house-
keeping and maintenance duties. 165 Grievances are minimal, because 
conflicts on the shop floor are resolved through a consultation pro-
cedure.166 Finally, these agreements create a two-tiered workforce with 
job security provisions, such as no layoffs except for unforseen or 
159. Holmes, supra note 57, at 99-105; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
160. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 61, 66. 
161. Michael R. Powers, The GM-UA W Saturn Agreement: A New Approach to Pre-
mature Recognition, 74 VA. L. REv. 89 (1988). 
162. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 61-63, 67. 
163. /d. 
164. /d. 
165. /d. 
166. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 194. 
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catastrophic events, that apply to 80 percent of the workforce, the 
permanent workers, but not to the remaining temporary workers. 167 
The UA W's interim cooperative labor-management agreements 
also contain provisions which go beyond addressing mandatory bar-
gaining subjects regarding the reorganization of work on the shop 
floor. Unlike the CAW's CAMI labor agreement, the UA W's agree-
ment extends to permissive bargaining strategic level subjects and 
involves union and worker participation in the recruitment and train-
ing of workers. 168 The UAW agreements with AutoAlliance, NUMMI, 
and Saturn provided that the automakers would hire a percentage of 
their employees, often 50 percent, from GM or Ford auto workers. 169 
The agreements also provided that the recruitment process would 
involve both union and management participation in the evaluation 
and selection of workers which the Saturn labor agreement extended 
to employee training. 170 In fact, the GM-UA W Saturn agreement went 
even further by eliminating Paragraph 8's management rights clause, 
a cornerstone of GM-UAW contracts since the 1930's171 and by ex-
tending the principle of joint labor-management participation in the 
operation of the firm, to union involvement in the design of the 
automobile, the engineering of the plant, the relationships with sup-
pliers and subcontractors, the selection of dealers, and the advertising, 
distribution, and sales of the Saturn. 172 
In sum, these interim agreements and the contracts that union 
locals subsequently negotiated have changed the meaning of the NLRA 
paradigm as it is defined by the GM-UA W Fordist labor-management 
relations model. Except for Saturn, they have left undisturbed man-
agement's strategic level control of the firm while extending mana-
gerial control to the shop floor by providing for integration on the 
basis of management-defined lean production principles. The GM-
UAW Saturn Labor Agreement also nominally discards the manage-
ment rights concept and then, on the basis of lean production and 
co-determination principles, provides for labor-management integra-
tion at all levels of industrial decision making. 173 So, taken together, 
these interim agreements suggest that labor-management integration, 
whether limited to shop floor or extended to the board room, would 
occur at management's discretion. 
167. /d. at 195. 
168. /d. at 197. 
169. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 61. 
170. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 197. 
171. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 62. 
172. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 197-99. 
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What these interim agreements would mean in practice was far 
from clear, because they were written in the vague and high trust 
language of lean production's cooperative approach to labor relations. 
As a result, their meaning was shaped by two unions' distinctive 
approaches to labor management relations: the UAW's commitment 
to cooperative labor-management relations and the CAW's attachment 
to an adversarial shop floor. The unions' national offices were labor's 
voice in worker recruitment and training. Once the union was rec-
ognized and local leadership elected, then the national office's rela-
tionship with the union's local would shape subsequent contract 
negotiations, shop floor practices, and strategic level governance. 
A. Recruitment and Training 
The UA W and CAW's distinctive labor management relations 
views were reflected in their approaches to worker recruitment and 
training. The CAW, given its adversarial shop floor view of labor-
management relations, left worker recruitment and training to CAMI 
management while the UAW's commitment to labor-management 
cooperation, beginning with NUMMI, led to its active involvement 
in both of these managerial activities. 174 The NUMMI-UA W Letter 
of Understanding provided that the GM-Toyota joint venture would 
hire at least 50 percent of its 2,500 person workforce from among 
laid off UAW workers at the former GM-Fremont plant. 175 The 
interim agreement also created a Joint Employee Assessment Plan for 
NUMMI and UAW personnel to evaluate and select workers on the 
basis of their "past attendance, disciplinary record, and attitude 
towards Toyota's production and labor relations standards." 176 As a 
consequence, the interim agreement did not permit NUMMI manage-
ment to screen out pro-union applicants, 177 but it did permit the 
automaker to select team players, because the former GM workers 
would be hired, not on the basis of their GM seniority, but on their 
"demonstrated ability and capacity and where those were equal, the 
job would go to the employee with the 'greater experience."' 178 
174. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor-Management Cooperation at NUMMI, 42 LAB. L.J. 57 
(1991). 
175. Jane Slaughter, Fremont Workers Will Be Rehired at OM-Toyota Plant-But not 
by Seniority, LAB. NoTES, Sept. 17, 1983, at 16. 
176. Kathleen V. McPherson, Contract Talks at OM-Toyota Plant May Set New Pal/ern 
for Auto Industry, LAB. NoTEs, July 1985, at I. 
177. !d. 
178. Jane Slaughter, Fremont Workers Will Be Rehired at OM-Toyota Plant-But Not 
by Seniority, LAB. NoTES, Sept. 17, 1983, at 16. 
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The NUMMI recruitment process served as the model for 
AutoAlliance, Diamond-Star, and Saturn. 179 At Saturn, the GM-UAW 
Saturn Labor Agreement, provided that GM would give preference 
to its UAW-represented workforce in hiring its employees.180 Saturn's 
Consensus Guidelines govern an extensive applicant screening and 
selection process conducted by the work unit which needs staff. 181 
Work units members use jointly prepared employee application forms 
to "explore not only the applicant's skills but something about their 
leadership qualities and adaptability to the Saturn culture. " 182 As a 
consequence, Saturn's cooperative employment process, like NUM-
MI's, permits GM to select team players and shape the shop floor 
culture. 183 Once workers are hired, the Consensus Guidelines also 
govern the joint administration of all training programs.184 One of 
the most extensive and innovative training programs among the Jap-
anese-Big Three joint ventures and Asian transplants, Saturn provides 
workers with 200 hours of training yearly .185 In spite of the appearance 
of equal labor-management influence, the training program is clearly 
biased against worker and union interests. Only a small portion, 
perhaps 30 percent, involves non-transferrable technical training while 
the remaining 70 percent focuses upon cultural or attitudinal training; 
i.e., indoctrination into the Saturn corporate ideology. 186 
B. The Shop Floor 
A collectively bargained contract is not completely understood 
by its own terms, but, as the document itself contemplates, it will be 
defined as it is applied and interpreted on the shop floor and through 
the process of grievance arbitration. Unlike the precise language of 
the Fordist labor contracts which define a job control shop floor, the 
general terms of the Saturn and joint ventures' lean production labor 
contracts cede job control to management•·s discretion. As a conse-
quence, the lean production shop floor has provided a wider arena 
for labor-management conflict over c9ntract application. In this set-
ting, the meaning of the contract has been shaped by the national 
179. For a brief discussion of the AutoAlliance recruitment process, see Richard C. Hill 
et al., Flat Rock: Home of Mazda: Social Impact of a Japanese Company on an American 
Community in THE AUTO INDUSTRY AHEAD: WHo's DRIVING 69-131 (Peter J. Arnesan ed., 
1989). 
180. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 5, at 194. 
181. ld. at 197. 
182. /d. 
183. /d. 
184. /d. 
185. Interview with Gary High, Manager, Human Resource Development, Saturn Corp., 
Spring Hill, Tenn. (Mar. 16, 1993). 
186. Yanarella & Green, supra note 2, at 64. 
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leadership's continuing involvement and by the local union's internal 
struggles, its relationship ·with its national office, and its daily en-
counters with management on the shop floor and in corporate offices. 
The UA W and CAW's continuing involvement in their union 
local's activities reflects their distinctive approaches to labor-manage-
ment relations. While the UA W downplayed "any problems or dis-
content because they're trying to get recognition [at] . . . Honda, 
Nissan, and Toyota's plant in Kentucky, " 187 the CAW has openly 
confronted lean production. 188 The CAW's "Statement on the Reor-
ganization of Work" outlined the national union's rejection of lean 
production methods and guided its close cooperation with its CAMI 
Local 88 and their relations with CAMI management. 189 As the CAW 
Research Group on CAMI observed, "The local occupies, or more 
accurately shapes, the space between a collective agreement that ac-
commodates aspects of team concept, and a policy statement of the 
national union that raises substantial questions about the implications 
of JPM. " 190 
The consensus within Local 88 and between it and the CAW 
national office is missing at NUMMI, AutoAlliance, and Saturn. At 
all three plants, the locals appear to be divided into rival caucuses 
which differ, not in their commitment to the team concept, but in 
terms of two views of labor-management cooperation. 191 The Admin-
istration Caucus at NUMMI and USA Caucus at AutoAlliance are 
willing to award substantial discretion to management. 192 On the other 
hand, the People's Caucus at NUMMI and New Direction Caucus at 
AutoAlliance are less trusting of management, seek more effective 
union representation, and argue that for ''true teamwork to take place 
. . . workers must have a strong and independent union to counter 
management's power. " 193 Even at Saturn, the GM-UAW model of 
labor-management harmony, Local 1853's recent election revealed its 
internal divisions. 194 In March, 1993, Mike Bennett, its president, was 
challenged by three rival candidates who were committed to the Saturn 
labor-management partnership, but who found considerable support 
187. Jane Slaughter, Dissent Grows at California OM-Toyota Plant, LAB. NoTES, Apr. 
1987, at 3. 
188. David Robertson et al., The Team Concept and Kaizen: Japanese Production Man-
agement in a Unionized Canadian Auto Plant, 39 STUD. IN PoL. EcoN. 77, 81 (1992). 
189. /d. 
190. Id. at 98. 
191. JOSEPH FUCINI & Suzy FUCINI, WORKING FOR THE JAPANESE: INSIDE MAZDA'S AMER-
ICAN AUTO PLANT 210 (1990). 
192. /d. at 198-201. 
193. Id. at 210. 
194. Neal Templin, UA W Chief at OM's Saturn Unit Vows to Back Consensus-Manage-
ment Pact, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1993, at A4. 
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for an agenda that called for putting more distance between union 
members and bosses. 195 A very divided Saturn local returned Bennett 
to office, but only by a bare majority in a run-off election. 196 
On the shop floor, management's lean production call for co-
operation has restructured power against a viable autonomous local 
union in the most subtle ways. Management's quest for shop floor 
control begins with rules which require that all employees from the 
president to production associates share the same restrooms, parking 
spaces, and cafeterias, and dress in the same outfits. 197 So demanding 
is management's commitment that disputes have arisen over buttons 
and pins. 198 In a more visible way, management, sometimes with the 
local union's assent, has further blurred labor-management distinc-
tions by providing a common office space for the union's represen-
tatives and management's industrial relations personnel. 199 In the early 
years, this approach at AutoAlliance was so successful that many 
younger workers did not distinguish between labor and management 
representatives. Management representatives at AutoAlliance, like their 
counterparts at NUMMI, often counseled against filing grievances in 
the name of harmony. 200 As a result, UAW Local 3000 at Auto-
Alliance, like CAW local 88 at CAMI, has established separate offices 
and then faced the real struggle for control of the shop floor. 
Shop floor control issues have been defined by the team concept 
and the common features of lean production labor relations. The 
spare outlines of the interim agreements have made the shop floor 
the setting for addressing management's lean production policies on 
absences from work, the replacement of sick or injured workers on 
the line, shift rotation, a two-track workforce, and grievance and 
arbitration procedures.201 The shop floor has also become the venue 
for defining the meaning of the team-based workplace and the critical 
role of the team leader. At CAMI, like AutoAlliance, "[t]he position 
of team leader is a focal point of tension and conflict between the 
union and the company. " 202 Here the shop floor control issue is 
whether the team leader is part of the management team or the union 
195. !d. 
196. !d. 
197. Robertson eta!., supra note 188, at 92-93. 
198. See, e.g., FuciNI & FUCINI, supra note 191, at 194-200. 
199. See, e.g., Mike Parker, New Mazda Contract Eases "Management-by-Stress" System, 
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team. 203 At AutoAlliance, this struggle may now favor the union local, 
because the 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreement provides that a 
team leader will be elected and subject to recall by team members.204 
After the vague and high trust language of these interim agree-
ments met the reality of the shop floor, contract negotiations have 
focused on the unions' efforts to reduce management's discretion on 
the shop floor and to resist management efforts to create an even 
tougher lean production workplace. Contract negotiations have also 
addressed the union concessions contained in the interim agreements, 
but enjoyed by UA W and CAW employees of the Big Three auto-
makers: wage parity, overtime pay, health and pension benefits, and 
no strike clauses on health and safety and work standards. The UA W 
and CAW have largely prevailed. Collective bargaining agreements 
have become more detailed documents and have begun to address the 
interests of workers in lean production auto plants. 
In sum, the Saturn and joint venture's interim labor agreements, 
framed in lean production's vague language, have provided manage-
ment with the opportunity to define the shop floor on their own 
terms. However, management has met with limited success from both 
the CAW's well-defined adversarial unionism and from UAW locals' 
whose commitment to the team concept and lean production have 
not prevented them, in spite of their internal divisions, from human-
izing the shop floor on which their members toil. 
2. Labor Law Dimensions 
The Saturn and joint ventures' interim labor agreements have the 
capacity to fundamentally alter the meaning of the NLRA paradigm 
and its Canadian variant. Whether or not these agreements, as private 
law, will lead to a paradigm shift depend upon their survival of legal 
challenges before the courts and labor relations boards. Although the 
NUMMI "Letter of Understanding" was the model for the interim 
labor agreements at CAMI, Diamond-Star, AutoAlliance, and Saturn, 
it was the GM-UAW Saturn Labor Agreement which became the test 
case. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation 
(NRWLDF) challenged two Saturn agreement provisions: the GM-
UA W decisions to grant preferential hiring rights to OM's UA W-
represented employees and to recognize the UA W as the bargaining 
agent for the Saturn employees. 205 The NRWLDF claimed that GM 
203. /d.at97. 
204. Steve Babson, Lean or Mean: The M.I. T. Model and Lean Production at Mazda, 
44 LAB. ST. J. 3, 19 (1993). 
205. Advice Memorandum Issued by NLRB on GM-UA W Saturn Agreement, D.L.R. 
(BNA) (June 9, 1986) at E-1, E-2. 
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and the UA W in agreeing to the preferential hiring clause, and in 
agreeing to the bargaining agent clause, had violated NLRA Sections 
8(a)(l), 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3), and 8(b)(l)(a). 206 
The NLRB's general counsel dismissed both claims. 207 The pref~ 
erential hiring rights clause did not discriminate against non-OM 
employees, because OM's need for a "ready supply of skilled 'labor' 
[wa]s a legitimate and substantial business justification for preferring 
its own employees .... " 208 Moreover, the clause was the lawful by-
product of mandatory effects bargaining:209 "An employer has a duty 
to bargain with a union over the economic effects that a management 
decision will have on union-represented employees, including a duty 
to bargain over preferential hiring treatment. " 210 The bargaining agent 
clause did not grant prehire recognition of the UAW, but granted 
future recognition if the UA W acquired majority support from Saturn 
employees.211 Subsequently, the NLRB Office of Appeals affirmed 
the decision, even though it might be "inconsistent with both Supreme 
Court precedent and previous Board decisions. " 212 In sum, the Saturn 
case has bestowed NLRB approval on paradigm change by means of 
interim agreements. 
3. Three Labor-Management Pre-Paradigms 
The UA W and CAW's interim agreements and collective con-
tracts with CAMI, AutoAlliance, NUMMI, and Saturn management 
contain elements of Fordist adversarialism, Japanese lean production 
cooperation, and German co-determination.213 The agreements antic-
ipate union worker participation which may range from integration 
into a lean production-defined shop floor to co-determination-based 
involvement in all strategic actions of the firm. 214 How these agree-
ments have operated in practice has depended upon the national union 
and its locals whose responses reflect a spectrum of acceptance and 
resistance to adversarialism, lean production cooperation, and co-
determination. These agreements and labor's experiences with them 
may be expressed in terms of three pre-paradigms which foreshadow 
the creation of a new labor management relations systems and its 
legal paradigm. 
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Pre-paradigm I is based on a CAMI-type agreement which es-
tablishes a management rights-based labor-management relationship 
at the strategic level. At CAM!, management has an unqualified right 
to recruit and train workers and, subject to the terms of a vaguely 
worded collective contract, to otherwise operate the firm. 215 The 
general language of the agreement provides management with the 
opportunity to extend its control to the shop floor on the basis of 
lean production labor relations principles. 216 But this effort has been 
resisted by the CAW and local 88 who are committed to the major 
principles of the GM-UAW Fordist adversarial labor-management 
relations model. 217 Thus, Pre-paradigm I limits labor's integration to 
the shop. floor where it is defined as a blend of lean production and 
adversarial labor-management relations and thus provides an arena 
for a shop floor struggle between adversarialism and cooperation in 
their purest form. 
Pre-paradigm II is based on a NUMMI or AutoAlliance-type 
collective contract which establishes a minimally qualified manage-
ment rights-based labor-management relationship at the strategic level 
that has permitted the UA W to participate in worker recruitment. 218 
Otherwise, NUMMI and AutoAlliance management have an unqual-
ified right, subject to the terms of high-trust and vaguely worded 
collective contracts, to operate their firms. 219 The collective agreement, 
as in Pre-paradigm I, also provides management with the opportunity 
to extend its control to the shop floor by employing lean production 
labor relations practices. However, over time, the struggle which 
occurs on the shop floor will be a mixed response by contending local 
union caucuses about how best to accomplish the objectives of lean 
production's cooperative labor management relations. 220 Thus, Pre-
paradigm II limits labor's integration, except for its worker recruit-
ment role, to the shop floor where it is defined in lean production's 
cooperative labor-management relation~ terms and provides an arena 
for a struggle between contending local union caucuses over the 
meaning of cooperation. 
Pre-paradigm III is based on a Saturn-type collective contract 
which discards the management rights clause and extends union joint 
participation beyond the shop floor221 to strategic level involvement 
215. /d. 
216. /d. 
217. /d. 
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in worker recruitment and training, the design of the Saturn and the 
plant, the selection of suppliers and subcontractors, and the advertis-
ing, distribution, and sales of the automobile.222 The collective agree-
ment, thereby, provides management with an even greater opportunity 
to exercise its control by applying lean production and co-determi-
nation labor relations principles to all aspects of industrial decision 
making. As a consequence, the shop floor struggle between contending 
local union caucuses about how best to accomplish the objectives of 
lean production's cooperative labor management relations is framed 
in terms of the wider pressures for labor's strategic cooperation on 
management's terms. Thus, Pre-paradigm III nominally extends la-
bor's integration to all levels of industrial decision making from the 
shop floor to the board room where it is defined in lean production 
and co-determination labor-management relations terms and provides 
an arena for a struggle between contending local union caucuses over 
the meaning of cooperation. Yet the union's almost complete inte-
gration makes the task of maintaining its independence more difficult, 
because jointness is practiced on management's terms. 
4. Summary 
The National Labor Relations Act and its Canadian variant may 
not be defined in the years to come by the Fordist adversarial labor-
management collective agreements which largely prevail at the Big 
Three's North American operations, but by an agreement defined in 
terms of one of the three pre-paradigms. Which one might it be? 
Lowell Turner argues that if unions are to survive and prosper in a 
competitive international arena, they need to be integrated into a 
firm's managerial decision making.223 In this case, Pre-paradigms I 
and II would not appear to be acceptable, because the CAW and 
VA W locals at CAMI, AutoAlliance, and NUMMI do not "substan-
tial[ly] particip[ate] ... with management regarding plans to reor-
ganize work before actual decisions are made .... " 224 Saturn's 
Consensus Guidelines suggest OM's labor-management jointness would 
satisfy Turner's criteria of "substantial participation, " 225 but Saturn's 
Pre-paradigm III approach to cooperative labor-management226 would 
be an unwise choice, because union participation is not supported by 
national legislation which provides a legal framework for labor's 
222. /d. 
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independent status in managerial decision making. 227 As a conse-
quence, Saturn seems to be merely a model for union subordination 
to management and a prescription for further decline into enterprise 
unionism. 
If labor law reform will be difficult because corporatist bargaining 
structures are weak and organized labor's political strength is limited, 
then organized labor might be well advised to pursue an adversarial 
collective bargaining strategy. In this case, an otherwise dismal pre-
diction for the UA W's future may be brightened by considering the 
CAW's Pre-paradigm I adversarial approach to CAMI shop floor 
labor-management relations. Here the question is whether CAMI will 
serve as the basis for a Model II labor relations system. 228 In fact, 
Turner has observed that whether his thesis is "flawed or at least in 
need of modification" may turn on the Canadian experience which 
may provide an alternative road for unions to explore in addressing 
the challenges of work reorganization. 229 Canadian labor does enjoy 
popular support and plays an active role in the New Democratic 
Party, but there is room for doubt that Canada will be able to acquire 
Model II characteristics, because corporatist bargaining structures are 
too weak, its labor federation is fragmented, and collective bargaining 
is not well coordinated. 
V. THE NLRA IN A Posr-FoRDIST ERA 
The National Labor Relations Act paradigm continues to serve 
as the legal foundation for Fordist model of adversarial labor rela-
tions. At the same time, the NLRA paradigm and its Canadian variant 
have permitted the UA W to negotiate pre-recruitment interim agree-
ments with the Japanese-Big Three and Saturn which have provided 
for labor-management cooperation on a wide range of strategic and 
shop floor matters.230 The NLRA paradigm has even allowed the 
Japanese transplants to screen out employees with pro-union sym-
pathies and to create a non-union workplace to discourage labor 
organizing. 231 
These labor relations developments have occurred, in part, be-
cause the NLRA is a limited labor-management relations paradigm 
which contemplates that labor and management will define the par-
adigm's private law dimension in their collective agreements. Oper-
ating inside the NLRA's public law framework, the parties first 
227. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 6-35 and accompanying text. 
229. TuRNER, supra note 14, at 235. 
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established the Fordist adversarial labor relations system defined in 
terms of the 1948 GM-UAW model and then in the 1980's created 
three labor relations pre-paradigms which may suggest the existence 
of a post-Fordist order. 232 At the same time, the Japanese transplants, 
operating outside the paradigm's limited regulatory scope, have in-
stitutionalized a non-union lean production labor relations model. 
If Turner is correct and cooperative labor-management re-
lations is the wave of the future, then organized labor needs to play 
an active role in a post-Fordist world by strengthening its hand in 
truly cooperative actions from the strategic level to the shop floor 
and by organizing the non-union transplants. Yet the redefinition of 
the NLRA paradigm by collective bargaining agreements at Saturn 
and the joint ventures and the practice of lean production labor 
relations at the Asian transplants do not bode well for the UA W, 
CAW, and North American autoworkers' prospects. Advancing trans-
plant labor organizing activities and promoting real labor-management 
cooperation will require alteration of the NLRA paradigm's public 
law dimension. 
The UA W and CAW both have an ongoing interest in labor law 
reform. However, the need is clearly more urgent in the United States, 
because Canadian labor law is more supportive of organized labor. 
The Clinton administration has recognized this need by putting labor 
law reform back on the political agenda with Secretary of Labor 
Robert Reich's appointment of a Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations chaired by John T. Dunlop. 233 One funda-
mental question the Dunlop Commission will need to address is: can 
the NLRA be altered to provide organized labor with the opportunity 
to play an active role in labor management relations that protects 
and advances its interests? In answering this question, the commission 
will need to distinguish between those changes which can be accom-
plished by judicial action and those which will require a legislative 
solution. 
Judicial Solution 
The National Labor Relations Act has been defined by NLRB 
and federal court of appeals decisions, but these administrative and 
judicial actions do not provide an encouraging avenue for labor law 
232. See supra notes 57-61, 216-25 and accompanying text. 
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reform. 234 NLRB and federal court decisions have increasingly made 
it more difficult for auto workers and the UAW to exercise their 
NLRA rights to organize, bargain with management, and to take 
concerted action. To rectify this situation, there are at least two 
judicial actions which would advance the ability of labor to organize 
the transplants and bargain with management over an overtly coop-
erative labor contract. 
The Supreme Court needs to reaffirm its commitment to its Cabot 
Carbon235 decision by overturning the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Court 
of Appeals decisions which "have departed from a strict reading of 
Section 8(a)(2) on such avowed policy grounds as rejection of a 'purely 
adversarial model of labor relations' and acceptance of a 'cooperative 
arrangement' .... " 236 The NLRB's recent decision in the Electro-
motion case may provide the Court with the opportunity to make a 
definitive statement about the use of lean production teams in a non-
union setting.237 A Supreme Court decision which found that the 
Japanese transplants' teams violated the NLRA Section 8(a)(2), be-
cause they impinged upon their employees' Section 7 rights would 
clearly strike a heavy blow at the non-union Japanese labor relations 
model (Model III) and in favor of union organizing and a pre-
paradigm collective contract outlined above, because it would overturn 
the decisions of the courts of appeal in which all the transplants are 
located. 
The Supreme Court also needs to overturn its decision in the 
Borg- War~er238 case and eliminate its "rigid and unrealistic dichot-
omy" between mandatory and permissive collective bargaining sub-
jects.239 Since the Wagner Act did not explicitly make this distinction, 
overturning Borg- Warner and eliminating this judicially-imposed dis-
tinction would expand the NLRA's scope beyond its judicially-nar-
rowed shop floor focus and grant labor an independent legal basis 
for strategic level participation. Since the Saturn Labor Agreement 
involves mandatory provisions, eliminating the mandatory-permissive 
dichotomy will threaten management's "entrepreneurial sover-
234. See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984); Hertzga & 
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eignty,' ' 240 but it will insure that management will not be able to have 
it both ways: speaking the language of cooperative labor-management 
relations but practicing the politics of managerial control. Overturning 
Borg- Warner will provide the opportunity to make cooperative co-
determined labor-management relations a reality. 
If the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Cabot Car-
bon and overturned the Borg- Warner decision, thereby judicially 
expanded labor's right to organize and extended its right to bargain 
over strategic level subjects, the court would clearly advance employ-
ees' Section 7 rights to cooperative co-determined labor-management 
relations. 241 Yet these judicial changes are only half of the equation. 
The other half which has the capacity to provide a comprehensive 
answer is labor law reform. Without labor law reform, organized 
labor has much to fear from labor-management cooperation and from 
the advocates of cooperation on the shop floor and adversarialism at 
the bargaining table. The Supreme Court's decision in the Yeshiva 
case suggests that adversarial bargaining may be a moot point if a 
federal appellate court would decide that auto workers are managers 
when they cooperate in deciding matters that have traditionally in-
volved strategic level subjects.242 So the UA W may be well advised 
not to abandon its adversarial tradition and cooperate in managerial 
decision-making until Congress seriously grapples with and resolves 
fundamental legal issues which have been brought into focus by the 
conflict between labor law paradigms. 
Legislative Solutions 
Labor law reform last attracted national political attention in 
1978 when Congress failed to pass the Carter administration's labor 
legislation.243 Now the Clinton administration has put labor law issues 
back on the political agenda with the establishment of the Dunlop 
Commission which will scrutinize the National Labor Relations Act 
and the Fordist model of adversarial labor management relations in 
making its proposals for labor law reform. 244 This time the reform 
proposals and the debate that they will generate are likely to focus 
on both union and non-union plant issues and be defined in terms of 
the contending labor law paradigms. NLRA Fordist and Japanese 
lean production labor relations paradigms will provide the backdrop 
240. /d. at 51. 
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and set the parameters for debate over non-union plant issues which 
will be driven primarily by the NLRA's Canadian variant and focus 
on labor organizing and unfair labor practice questions. On the other 
hand, union plant issues will be guided by the German co-determi-
nation paradigm and focus on collective bargaining and grievance 
settlement issues. 245 
In crafting legislation, the Reich Commission and later the Clin-
ton administration will have a wide range of proposals to consider.246 
Scrapping the NLRA and leaving labor legislation to the states will 
not receive any serious consideration. Section 14(b)'s demise might 
eliminate a safe haven for non-union transplants, but only Nissan is 
located in a Right to Work state and the Japanese automakers success 
in resisting the UA W's organizing effort has been attributed to Ten-
nessee's anti-union culture.247 Incremental changes in the structure of 
the NLRA paradigm are more likely to be included in the adminis-
trations's proposals. One frequently touted proposal drawn from the 
Canadian experience-shorter union certification campaigns and the 
use of union authorization cards-should be accepted hesitantly. The 
UAW and CAW's experience with the Asian transplants suggests that 
this reform may be helpful, but it should be remembered that CAMI 
was organized by a pre-hire agreement similar to those at Mazda, 
NUMMI, and Saturn, and that the CAW, even though it can rely on 
the union authorization cards, has not succeeded in organizing Honda, 
Toyota, and Hyundai. 
Is it possible to move beyond these incremental reform proposals 
towards a reconceptualization of the NLRA paradigm? The Clinton 
administration is said to be enamored of the German co-determination 
model (Model 111).248 If this is true, the administration will be attracted 
to Barry and Irving Bluestone's Negotiating the Future249 in which 
they propose to move beyond Fordist collective bargaining's narrow 
shop floor level to a German co-determination-inspired ''Enterprise 
Compact" most closely embodied in the Saturn labor agreement and 
its Consensus Guidelines. 25° Consistent with Pre-paradigm Ill, their 
245. Samuel Estreicher, Employee Voice in Competitive Markets, THE AM. PROSPECT, 
Summer, 1993, at 48, 51-52. 
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Enterprise Compact would eliminate management's exclusive right to 
direct the firm and "herald joint labor-management action on all 
decisions of the firm, both workplace and strategic."251 To create this 
new labor-management relations paradigm, the Bluestones do not 
believe it will be "absolutely necessary" to amend the NLRA, but 
they argue that "rewriting it ... to give participatory management a 
government imprimatur would have the salutary effect of encouraging 
management and labor to consider adopting the spirit, and perhaps 
the provisions of the Enterprise Company.252 
The Enterprise Compact is a provocative proposal, but it is 
faulted, because it fails to appreciate the critical support a legal 
infrastructure provides for paradigm change. In spite of the Blue-
stones' belief, rewriting the NLRA is unlikely to happen, because 
labor-management jointness is only possible where there is a cohesive 
labor movement backed by corporatist bargaining and supported by 
a political party and labor laws which provide the basis for inde-
pendent labor participation in industrial decision making. In the 
United States,. however, the labor movement is divided over the virtues 
of adversarialism and cooperation, corporatist bargaining and political 
party support is weak, and the National Labor Relations Act does 
not provide the legal foundation for organized labor's independent 
participation. 
In sum, the Clinton administration's legislative package is likely 
to include Canadian-inspired non-union plant proposals which will 
hopefully restore to the NRLA paradigm a more labor-oriented focus. 
The administration's package may also use some co-determination 
language, but it is unlikely to include proposals which would reaffirm 
Cabot Carbon, overrule Borg-Warner, and support labor-management 
co-determination. The character of the United States Model IV labor-
management relations system will shape the president's proposals and 
the prospects for reform. Those prospects are dim if one accepts 
Lowell Turner's contention about the· United States labor relations 
system: that corporatist bargaining structures are weak, organized 
labor's peak association is fragmented, and, organized labor enjoys 
only marginally increased support from the public, the Democratic 
Party, and the Clinton administration. 253 Succinctly stated, business 
opposition is too great, union power is too weak, "the United States 
... is not Germany."254 As a consequence, Congress is likely to see 
only minimal legal changes which the Clinton administration will 
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claim establish a more level playing field for labor and management, 
but which will, in fact, allow business to be more competitive in a 
global marketplace than to meaningfully advance the interests of 
labor. 
